Mossad still operational in Iran

“These are not isolated technical malfunctions,” said Dr. Nima Baheli, an Iranian political analyst. There’s a pattern. These explosions are occurring with too much frequency and too much silence from the regime to be coincidental,” he added.

Baheli pointed to a largely overlooked factor: the role of Afghan migrant workers in Iran. Following the 12-day war in June, Iran forcibly deported thousands of undocumented Afghans, many of whom had worked in construction, infrastructure, and sensitive logistical roles. According to Baheli, their sudden expulsion may now be producing an unexpected backlash.

“These workers had access. They knew the locations, the systems, the blind spots,” he explained. “There’s a growing narrative among some circles that what we’re seeing now is a form of retaliatory sabotage, an internal actor striking back from within,” he added.

In previous conflicts, Baheli noted, the regime suspected the Afghan community of acting as a fifth column on behalf of Israel. He emphasized, however, that this time the motivation appears different: “What’s happening now seems less like collaboration with foreign intelligence and more like revenge. These are people pushed out violently, stripped of rights, and humiliated. Their actions, if they are behind these incidents, reflect anger toward the Islamic Republic, not coordination with Israel,” he pointed out.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, does not rule out another possibility: that Mossad operations may still be active within Iran.

“The precision of some of these attacks—the fact that they’ve hit specific, sensitive locations—does resemble Mossad’s operational signature,” he said. “Yes, they did what they did in a very successful manner during the conflict, and I believe not all of those intelligence assets were exposed. It’s very likely that Israel continues to maintain capabilities on the ground,” he added.

Yanarocak said these operations, if ongoing, are part of Israel’s longstanding intelligence doctrine. “Israel doesn’t rely solely on airpower. Ground-level operations—targeted, quiet, surgical—are often more effective in shaping enemy behavior without triggering a wider war,” he said. He also noted that continued covert activities may be linked to the ongoing threat posed by the Houthis, who have continued to launch missiles at Israel despite the broader ceasefire.

“Israel is learning from these new threats,” he said. “The reality is that asymmetric actors like the Houthis have changed the security equation. Intelligence and unconventional deterrence are now more critical than ever,” he added.

Iran has also unveiled the Qassem Bassir medium-range ballistic missile, signaling an intent to upgrade its strike capabilities despite sanctions.

Yet despite the military posturing, some experts see restraint. “Iran was humiliated in June, but it knows a second round would be suicidal,” Yanarocak said. “The airstrikes Israel carried out demonstrated both air and intelligence superiority. Iran’s leaders understand that another direct confrontation could devastate their infrastructure, economy, and international leverage,” he added.

He interpreted recent Iranian airspace closures and radar tests as defensive recalibration, not preparation for attack. “We may be seeing deterrence-building, not escalation. Still, the Israeli security establishment is alert. If intelligence confirms that Iran is resuming nuclear enrichment or preparing for an attack, preemptive action remains on the table,” he said.

Baheli, however, views the situation differently. “This is not just about rebuilding air defense. Iran is actively seeking partnerships with non-Western actors—China, Russia, North Korea—to shift the balance. We’re witnessing the emergence of a pragmatic alliance of sanctioned powers. This isn't just military; it's political,” he noted.

Israel responded with limited airstrikes on HTS military assets, citing its longstanding commitment to protecting the Druze, many of whom serve in the Israeli army and maintain deep social ties across the border.

But the scale of Israel’s intervention has prompted debate. According to Baheli, this round of strikes was “symbolic rather than strategic.” He argued that unlike past operations, Israel’s limited engagement signals a possible political calculation.

“There is speculation that Israel might be eyeing an international recognition of its sovereignty over the Golan Heights and a permanent security presence around Mount Hermon,” he said. “If that’s the trade-off, then the Druze, who have been allies for decades, may find themselves politically expendable. That would be a historic reversal in Israel’s commitments,” he added.

Yanarocak dismissed the idea that Israel would compromise its position on the Druze for geopolitical gains. “Israel is acting to protect the Druze,” he said, noting that this role could actually complicate efforts toward future agreements with Syria. He warned instead that the more immediate threat is Turkish influence: “The Druze and the Kurds are constituting a challenge for the Turks and for the Syrian administration. … We may see the deepening of Turkish intervention inside Syria,” he added.

According to Yanarocak, Israel’s goal is to prevent Turkish-backed consolidation in southern Syria and to preserve the status quo, rather than seeking normalization with President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime. “There are no illusions in Jerusalem about Damascus suddenly becoming a partner,” he added. “But we won’t let the Druze be overrun by actors aligned with Ankara.”

Despite the absence of active warfare, both experts caution that the ceasefire has created a tense interlude, but not a genuine resolution.

For Baheli, the risk of a second round remains real and perhaps inevitable if underlying grievances are left to fester. “This is not a frozen conflict, it’s a volatile one,” he said. “Iran may not initiate the next round, but it is for sure preparing to respond in case it is attacked. According to Iranian statements, Israel may attack soon, within two weeks from now, but we have to wait and see,” he added.

Yanarocak is more cautiously optimistic, but not complacent. “Israel is not interested in a second round. The message was delivered in June, and the deterrence remains strong,” he said. “But deterrence has an expiration date. If Iran resumes enrichment or lines are crossed, we will attack preemptively again,” he concluded.