Stopping Iran’s nuclear program: Negotiations or military action

In recent weeks, nearly every statement by U.S. President Donald Trump has been dissected in Israel and quickly categorized as either “positive” or “negative” in terms of the likelihood of a strong agreement or military intervention. But while the instinct to understand Washington’s direction is understandable, it’s important to distinguish between the fundamental positions of the parties involved and the evolving negotiation strategy itself. Failing to do so may lead to premature conclusions and poorly informed decisions.

Both sides are seasoned players in complex diplomatic battles. Israel’s historical experience suggests that Iran is especially adept at extracting concessions from the West, often advancing its nuclear ambitions behind the veil of negotiations and crisis diplomacy. Conversely, Western governments—particularly past U.S. administrations—are frequently perceived in Israel as naïve or soft, with the failed 2015 JCPOA cited as a prime example.

In today’s reality, that perception deserves to be challenged. The United States should be given more credit, particularly when it comes to its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Moreover, the debate shouldn't be framed as a binary choice between diplomacy and force. In complex security environments, hybrid strategies are more realistic and effective.

This means that negotiations with Iran can and should proceed alongside military preparations—either as a pressure tactic to strengthen diplomatic leverage or as a viable standalone path should diplomacy fail. Unlike previous rounds of talks, these negotiations are taking place in the shadow of increased U.S. military presence in the region, following the deployment of significant assets in Yemen and repeated declarations by President Trump about the legitimacy of the military option.

We are in a period marked by both dialogue and confrontation. The Trump administration appears willing to use a mix of tools—gradually or in tandem—rather than placing all its bets on one strategy. The military option, while not preferred, is clearly more prominent in this administration’s calculus than in the past.

For its part, Israel must define what constitutes a “good agreement” using clear, professional standards. This would serve as a reference point for both diplomatic and military planning. A “good deal” should include:

Eliminating enrichment capabilities: Full removal of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile; dismantling and removing all centrifuges (active and stored); confiscation of raw materials used in centrifuge production; and irreversible dismantlement of enrichment infrastructure.

No expiration date: Unlike the JCPOA, the agreement must be permanent. It should bar Iran from any independent uranium enrichment indefinitely and allow for civilian nuclear energy only under Western oversight and without a domestic nuclear fuel cycle.

Neutralizing military dimensions: Previous agreements largely ignored Iran’s weaponization program. A proper deal must include oversight of nuclear-related knowledge and personnel, inspections of suspicious facilities, and the confiscation of equipment from the AMAD military project.

Time limits are also crucial. One of Iran’s main goals in entering negotiations is to stall for time—to ride out Trump’s presidency or wait until the issue fades from the U.S. agenda. Time constraints should therefore serve not only as diplomatic incentives but also as deadlines: a clock ticking down toward increased sanctions or even military engagement.

Israel must monitor both the official negotiation rounds and the quieter developments in between. It should maintain respectful, professional engagement with the U.S. administration—firmly standing by the principles of a “good agreement,” while also preparing alternative courses of action, all in close coordination with Washington.

Now more than ever, Israel must remind the Americans of the urgency of the moment. Iran may have come to the negotiating table from a position of strategic weakness, and the talks may offer it some temporary breathing room. But with firm U.S. resolve, a strong agreement is achievable—or, if talks fail, an effective military response may follow.

Finally, despite what may seem like a recent American pivot away from Israel’s position, such as the Yemen ceasefire or emerging deals with Saudi Arabia, Israel’s stance on the nuclear issue remains critically important. Israel must recognize its role and act accordingly, with unwavering focus on the ultimate goal: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.