In a video statement released as mass protests were held across the country, Netanyahu defended the dismissal and presented what he described as “a dramatic revelation of facts that will shake you.”
The unusually timed video, which included personal correspondence between Netanyahu and Bar, was recorded while the two were attending a Security Cabinet meeting on Saturday evening.
Netanyahu insisted the government had acted within its legal authority. “We are a country of law, and the law in Israel clearly states: the government is permitted to terminate the service of the Shin Bet director before the end of his term, and that is exactly what it did,” he said.
The prime minister addressed allegations that the firing was aimed at disrupting an ongoing investigation into alleged foreign funding from Qatar, known as “Qatar-Gate.” Netanyahu denied this, claiming that his loss of confidence in Bar began on Oct. 7, the day of Hamas’ deadly surprise attack, when, he said, Bar failed to alert him and others in time.
He said the distrust intensified over time and led to Bar’s removal from Israel’s negotiating team in ongoing hostage talks. “All of this occurred long before the Qatar investigation began,” Netanyahu said, adding that he intended to dismiss Bar only after receiving Shin Bet’s internal probe into the Oct. 7 failures—a process that, he said, mirrored how he handled the military chief’s review.
Netanyahu suggested this timing was no coincidence, implying that Bar coordinated with the attorney general to derail his dismissal. “In a rare and unbelievable coincidence,” Netanyahu said, “the attorney general announced the Qatar investigation at 9 p.m., the very day Bar missed the extended deadline.”
Bar’s letter, dated Feb. 15, confirmed he could not meet the initial deadline set by Netanyahu. He explained that the Shin Bet investigation had been structured as a thorough, multi-stage process set to conclude by the end of March, accounting for complex security concerns and increasing regional threats.
Bar noted that the Supreme Court, after reviewing those threats, had already ruled that the state comptroller's review of the Shin Bet and IDF’s conduct in the war would not begin before March 2025. He said Netanyahu’s sudden demand for the report within 14 days was both unrealistic and potentially damaging to national security.
“We view this investigation with the utmost seriousness, just as we do the prime minister’s requests,” Bar wrote. “But this review cannot be completed in two weeks without shortcuts—and those would endanger lives.”
He added that his proposal to form an external committee was delayed by Netanyahu’s office for four months, forcing the process to be restructured.
In his follow-up letter to Netanyahu, Bar said the Shin Bet’s senior leadership had already held 10 full-day sessions to process the events of Oct. 7, and more were scheduled. He said the agency had accelerated the review at Netanyahu’s request but stressed that rushed findings would compromise the investigation’s integrity.
He also expressed concern that the government rejected his request for a short extension without explanation, despite Netanyahu’s awareness of current threats and the Shin Bet’s role in addressing them.
Bar concluded that a rushed and incomplete report would be a disservice to national security and future preparedness. “Such a critical document must be thorough and complete—not hollow and compromised,” he wrote.
Despite Netanyahu’s assertion that the Qatar-Gate investigation was launched to block Bar’s dismissal, Baharav-Miara’s office responded that the timeline shows the reverse. According to the attorney general, the investigation began before the firing process escalated. Reporters noted that on Feb. 9, a journalist contacted Netanyahu’s office for comment on allegations of Qatari funding. The next day, Netanyahu formally asked Bar to expedite the report.
Further discrepancies in Netanyahu’s timeline have also surfaced. While he claimed his distrust in Bar began on Oct. 7, sources say it was Netanyahu’s own intelligence officer—not Bar—who failed to relay early warnings. Additionally, Bar was officially removed from the negotiating team on Feb. 18, a week after the Prime Minister’s Office was already fielding questions about Qatar.
Netanyahu’s office maintains he requested the report as early as Jan. 29, but that detail is not reflected in the documents the prime minister has made public.
